Social Distrust and Immigrant Access to Welfare Programs in the American States

ADAM M. BUTZ
California State University, Long Beach

JASON E. KEHRBERG
Muskingum University

Social trust ameliorates collective action problems by allowing multicultural societies to adopt more inclusive and equitable public policies directed toward newly arriving immigrants. However, existing research warns that increasing ethnic diversity from immigrant populations can undermine levels of social trust, hindering mass support for redistributive policies that empower low-income minority populations. This article examines the relationship between U.S. state-level social trust and immigrant access to social welfare programs using multilevel regression with post-stratification to estimate state-level attitudes of distrust. Distrust is found to be associated with reduced immigrant access to redistributive social programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Supplemental Security Income, and Medicaid. Interestingly, patterns of distrust and strict immigrant welfare exclusion are more pronounced among low immigrant Southern states, while high immigrant states exhibit relatively inclusive and accommodative policies.

Keywords: Welfare and Social Policy, Immigration Policy/Migration Issues, Social Trust, Social Distrust, Ethnicity, Diversity, Welfare Programs, Redistributive Social Programs, United States, Southern States, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, TANF, PRWORA.

Related Articles:
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La confianza social disminuye problemas de acción colectiva al permitir a las sociedades multiculturales adoptar políticas públicas más inclusivas y equitativas hacia los inmigrantes recien llegados. No obstante, investigación existente advierte que al incrementarse la diversidad étnica de la población inmigrante se pueden subvertir los niveles de confianza social, obstruyendo el apoyo popular de políticas redistributivas que enpoderan poblaciones de minorías de bajo ingreso. Este artículo examina la relación entre confianza social y aceso de inmigrantes a programas de bienestar al nivel estatal en los Estados Unidos usando regresión de multinivel con pos-estratificación para estimar actitudes de desconfianza en el nivel estatal. Encontramos que la desconfianza está asociada con aceso reducido de los inmigrantes a los programas sociales redistributivos, tales como Asistencia Temporal a las Familias Necesitadas (TANF por sus siglas en inglés), Suplemento de Ingreso de Seguridad Social, y Medicaid. Interesantemente, los patrones de desconfianza y la exclusión estrícta de beneficios a los inmigrantes son más pronunciados entre estados sureños de baja inmigración mientras que estados de elevada inmigración exhiben políticas relativamente incluyentes y adaptables.

The idealist notion of America's melting pot coexisting with disparate immigrant populations perpetually coincides with economic and cultural anxieties of the native citizenry. Newcomers are often perceived as properly assimilating with a trustworthy ability to reciprocate work ethic and neighborly goodwill, but are just as likely constructed with unflattering frames of lingering

dependence on public assistance and lack of good faith citizenship efforts. Comparative research in the European and Scandinavian contexts demonstrates that the perceived trustworthiness of immigrants can influence social citizenship rights and access to redistributive benefits (Crepaz 2008). As many European countries and the United States experienced rapidly growing immigrant populations over the last half-century, native populations became more concerned with immigration and the impact of immigration on welfare systems (Crepaz 2008; Kymlicka and Banting 2006). In particular, lingering fears that undeserving immigrant populations will exploit welfare generosity and drain social services engenders less accommodative posturing from native populations. The most recent quantitative evidence suggests that less trusting countries trend toward "welfare chauvinism"—reserving welfare benefits exclusively for native citizens and restricting access to noncitizens (Banting 2000; Faist 1994)—while more trusting countries exhibit widened access that includes immigrants (Crepaz 2008). When natives believe that newly arriving immigrants will properly utilize means-tested public assistance for limited and temporary relief to better themselves and society, they are more likely to broadly open program access to these marginalized groups.

Less is known concerning trust-policy connections in the U.S. subnational context, where decentralized state-level welfare reforms have created "hard boundaries" to benefits that include strict citizenship requirements for newly arriving immigrants (Calavita 1996; Filindra 2013; Graefe *et al.* 2008; Hero and Preuhs 2007). American federalism and the devolution of welfare and immigrant policy making to the state level, ensures that a patchwork of social rights exist for the rising immigrant population (Boushey and Luedtke 2011; Filindra and Kovacs 2010; Monogan 2013). An increasing presence of immigrants, especially those from culturally dissimilar Latin and Central American countries, arguably represents unsettling change to many natives, allowing political elites to form constituencies of already distrusting individuals in support of restrictive public policy (see e.g., Buchanan 2002; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Hopkins 2010; Huntington 2004; Schneider and Ingram 1997; Turner and Sharry 2012). In turn, this article examines how social distrust initially forms at the individual level and subsequently connects how U.S. state citizenries influence immigrant exclusion from government-sponsored redistributive social programs (Crepaz 2008; Filindra 2013; Kymlicka and Banting 2006; Marshall 1950).

We offer evidence supporting the argument that state-level welfare reforms regarding immigrant access to means-tested benefits are motivated partly by state-level attitudes of distrust among the native citizenry. In states where individuals are more distrusting of others, welfare access to noncitizens is found to be more restrictive, after controlling for critical socioeconomic and political factors such as immigrant presence, unemployment, and citizen conservatism. Interestingly, immediate proximity to sizeable immigrant populations proves to be a weak predictor of welfare exclusion, while Southern residency better predicts immigrant welfare access. We surmise that historic cultural division in heavily populated

African American and Southern states has disproportionately undermined levels of social trust more generally extended to immigrant groups and can potentially explain the contemporary propensity for immigrant welfare restriction. Chauvinist welfare policy responses in the U.S. states do not follow immigrant residency patterns and palpable "threat" dynamics, but instead are the function of historically depressed levels of trustworthiness toward outsiders.

Immigration, Social Trust, and the Construction of Welfare Boundaries

Trust between humans represents shared feelings of commonality, solidarity, and reciprocity forming the bedrock of successful interpersonal interaction in society (Crepaz 2008; Uslaner 2002). Germane to this project, scholars argue that perceptions of trustworthiness are particularly important to support of social welfare programs (Crepaz 2008; Kymlicka and Banting 2006). According to Marcus Crepaz (2008, 126), "[t]rust becomes relevant at the intersection between the welfare state and individual behavior." As such, society extends generosity when members trust that beneficiaries properly accept benefits to better themselves and society.[1] Trust promotes commonality and solidarity among social groups and potentially shapes welfare policies that target newcomers. The magnitude of sustained interpersonal connections in maintaining the social safety net is echoed by Kymlicka and Banting (2006, 282) who write that, "[t]he general idea is that a viable welfare state. . .depends on achieving and maintaining a high level of solidarity among citizens, and that this in turn rests on feelings of commonality among citizens." There is growing academic consensus that trustworthiness can potentially have a profound impact on welfare benefits (Crepaz 2008; Kymlicka and Banting 2006), but scholars disagree over the influence of increased diversity on social trust and its potential connection to policy adoptions.

Robert Putnam (1993, 2000), among others, argues that significant motivators of social capital and trustworthiness are "bonding" and "bridging" among individuals inside and outside of the immediate identity groups. Bonding refers to reciprocal connections forged with people of similar cultural identity, while bridging refers to relationships and understanding reached with out-group members, such as immigrant populations. On this account, trusting out-group identities and desiring commonality with other cultures is the inevitable by-product of in-group activities with ethnic peers. Bonding with in-group members will eventually "spill over" into bridging activities that increase levels of societal trust and support for communal welfare expansion (Crepaz 2008). Ethnic diversity from immigration threatens to dismantle established norms of social trust, because natives should initially encounter and maintain sustained physical connection with cultural outsiders, oftentimes Latino, before building sustained, trusting

[1]Research on death penalty preferences finds that individuals with high levels of social trust are less supportive of the death penalty overall and more supportive of the rights of other individuals, including out-group members (Soss, Langbein, and Metelko 2003).

relationships and inclusive public policies. According to the "constrict theory" increased immigration results in individuals isolating themselves and eventually becoming more distrusting of both ethnic minorities and in-group members (Putnam 2007). Immigration, from Latin America especially, has been increasing steadily over the last few decades. As a result, American immigration is most readily associated with Latino identity (Chavez 2008). In sum, social trust toward immigrants entering America should be undermined foremost in heavily immigrant and Latino contexts resulting in welfare policy restrictions.

More recent research questions participatory-based accounts of social trust by insisting that trust in others is more a dispositional or deeply engrained moral trait learned early in life from parents or guardians (Uslaner 2002). As such, immediate life experiences and sustained participatory interaction with outsiders are less influential than deeply entrenched psychological considerations that form the cornerstone of social trust. "This moral foundation of trust means that we must do more than simply cooperate with others we know are trustworthy, we must have positive views of strangers, of people who are different from ourselves and *presume that they are trustworthy*" (Uslaner 2002, 2, emphasis in the original).[2] This account suggests that social trust is largely developed through long-term social learning, unique historical circumstances, and socialization processes. Thus immigrant diversity might not reflexively yield fractious intergroup relations and welfare chauvinism because native populations are responding to immediate demographic contexts with some *pre-existing level of social trust* (Crepaz 2008).

Crepaz's (2008) comparative findings suggest that countries with higher established levels of social trust, such as Norway, Sweden, and Denmark are predisposed to think more positively of immigrants and therefore react with policies that incorporate immigrants into government-sponsored social welfare programs. The prognosis for immigration and the U.S. welfare state is unsurprisingly pessimistic. America's history is one of perpetual ethnic and racial tension that strains levels of social trust and dampens support for direct relief (Crepaz 2008). While this assertion might be warranted in a comparative analysis across countries, an inherent methodological limitation rests in treating America as a single political entity. In a comparative analysis with other European and Scandinavian countries, the United States may well exhibit relatively lower levels of social trust and more restrictive social welfare programs, but the United States is a complex society replete with unique regional histories and decentralized political control that favors state and local autonomy.[3] There

[2]Uslaner's (2002) dispositional and moral foundation of "generalized" trust mirrors Crepaz's (2008) notion of "universal" trust, Mansbridge's (1999) notion of "altruistic" trust, and Hetherington's (2005) notion of "social" trust. All of these conceptualizations encompass to some degree feelings of commonality and believing the best about people with cultural differences.

[3]For a more complete discussion of immigrant policy and American federalism, see Boushey and Luedtke (2011) or Filindra and Kovacs (2010).

likely exists significant and interesting variation in attitudes of social trust and public policy adoptions across U.S. state-level contexts. Through the empirical leverage afforded by U.S. federalism, this article seeks to better understand how the dynamics of immigration and social trust influence redistributive welfare policy choices in the U.S. states.

Dynamics of Social Trust and Immigrant Welfare Access in America

American social welfare policy is highly diffused and most thoroughly developed at the state and local levels (Gainsborough 2003; Kim and Fording 2010; Soss *et al*. 2001), ensuring variation in opinion dynamics and welfare policies across states. Transporting the logic of Crepaz's (2008) and Uslaner's (2002) central theoretical arguments into the American context, we predict that, *ceteris paribus*, states with greater levels of social distrust should exhibit exclusionary and restrictive immigrant welfare boundaries, whereas policy responses in more trusting states should reflect open and expansionary access for noncitizens. Consistent with dispositional conceptions of trust, we believe this relationship rests heavily upon historical regional dynamics of racial division and group conflict that are most pronounced among Southern states with large African American populations, not states with large Latino or immigrant populations. It is our contention that racial subjugation and division have disproportionately fomented attitudes of social distrust in the American South, and thus distrust is predictive of immigrant welfare restrictions more often in heavily populated Black states, not heavily immigrant or Latino contexts.

An established body of scholarly research empirically connects racial prejudice toward African Americans with welfare policy attitudes. For instance, Gilens (1999) finds that enduring African American stereotypes as being "lazy" and "undeserving" are the strongest predictors of Whites' opposition to welfare spending. However, prejudice and social trust are distinct concepts and not directly analogous. Social-psychological belief-congruency theory was developed to explain prejudice by predicting that individuals hold more positive stereotypes of their in-group and out-group members are evaluated in comparison to the in-group (Rokeach, Smith, and Evans 1960). Greater perceived differences between group identities results in more negative stereotypes of out-groups that weaken common social bonds and lower social trust. Outgroup members are thus viewed as undeserving members of society. This notion of "deservingness" reverberates throughout Uslaner's (2002) and Crepaz's (2008) moral conceptions of social trust, in which outsiders who are perceived to be trustworthy—using welfare programs in appropriate not exploitative ways—are ultimately deserving of full citizenship rights and benefits. Prejudice is a strong predictor of social trust that undergirds support for immigrant access to welfare programs.

Complementary state-level research finds that racial context significantly affects the generosity of welfare policy adoptions (see Soss *et al*. 2001).

Numerous studies document that states with sizeable African American populations are found to have the least generous cash benefits and most stringent welfare policy rules (see e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Key 1949; Soss *et al*. 2001). This line of research argues that the presence of African American populations heightens feelings of racial "threat" among the White majority which ultimately leads to less generous welfare policy adoptions that assist low-income citizenries. African Americans doubtlessly share an intimate association with the American welfare state, and it is our contention that the Black–White paradigm additionally extends to citizenship dimensions of state welfare policy, resulting in limited immigrant access in disproportionately Black states.

Disproportionately Black contexts are found primarily among Southern states that have documented histories of systematic White superiority, racial subjugation, and unmatched ethnic strife (Epps 2006). Historian Kristina DuRocher (2011, 11) describes the distinctive flavor of Southern racial socialization writing that, "[racial segregation] broadly shaped the South's cultural, ideological, and political trends. In tracing out these historical antecedents of socialization to understand the shifts, maintenance, and perpetuation of power structures in the past, we might also reflect on our own culture today." Historically, racial threat in heavily populated Black states, fueled by a legacy of racial segregation and subjugation, has worked to depress levels of social trust toward others and can likely help explain contemporary patterns in immigrant welfare access. It is our assertion that a distinctive Southern heritage of racial "threat" (see Key 1949) manifests itself in enduring and distrusting attitudes toward out-group members that extends to newly arriving immigrants.[4]

In comparison, the perceived threat of Latinos[5] is a more recent phenomenon on the national stage along with individual responses to the media driven Latino Threat Narrative (see Chavez 2008). Even though Latinos have resided within the United States for generations, the Latino population increased dramatically in the 1970s and expanded to other regions of the United States by the 1990s. The Latino population nearly tripled to roughly 12.5 percent of the U.S. population between 1970 and 2000. This population increase is partially fueled by the policies adopted in the Hart-Celler Act of 1965 that allowed a greater flow of immigrants from non-European

[4]Distrust generated by the historical context of Southern states is likely to influence the overall benefit levels and punitive policies of the welfare system for natives as well.

[5]It is rather difficult to define the Latino community due to the variety of racial, ethnic, and geographic differences of people viewed to be in this community. Fraga and others (2010, 145) define Latino members as being individuals "whose origins/ancestry are connected to Latin America and the Iberian Peninsula." They find evidence of a growing self-identification with the Pan-Ethnic Latino identity. In addition, the media and the American society create the perception of a Latino ethnic group by combining individuals from Mexico, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and other countries into a single identity.

countries.[6] Historically, the Latino population was concentrated in states such as California, Florida, Texas, and New York (Borjas 1999), but newer Latino immigrants began to settle in new destinations, such as Iowa, Colorado, and North Carolina (Singer, Hardwick, and Brettell 2008). We argue that the policy reactions of states to immigrants, especially concerning accessibility to welfare benefits, are partially dependent on dispositional levels of trust generated by preexisting social contexts. Due to the historical context of the American society, heavily Black and Southern states, not those states currently housing sizeable immigrant or Latino populations, will exhibit lower overall levels of social trust and possess the strictest immigrant access to social welfare programs (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002).

Immigrant Welfare Boundaries in an Age of Devolution

A sense of community between the majority and minorities forms bonds of trust that in turn create support for the welfare state and more inclusive public policies (Carens 1988; Crepaz 2008). Even the historical development of the American welfare state occurred with little perceived solidarity with many racial and ethnic minorities. For example, the Northwest and Midwest had more generous and inclusive welfare programs for European immigrants than Southern states did for Black citizens and Southwest states did for Latino citizens and immigrants in the early 1900s (Fox 2012). This pattern continued to more recent welfare reforms in 1996 when President Clinton "ended welfare as we know it" by signing into law the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) and its primary cash assistance program known as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). PRWORA eliminated federal entitlements to cash benefits, instituted rigid work requirements, and most importantly for our purposes decentralized policy-making authority downward to states and localities (see e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss *et al*. 2001). While all states follow a standard workfare framework that requires employment in conditional exchange for benefits, "devolution" in welfare policy making means that states and localities are responsible for crafting welfare policies, resulting in substantial variation in state-level policy approaches (Kim and Fording 2010; Soss *et al*. 2001). National-level reform cemented a decentralized system of state-level welfare policies, resulting in varying levels of access and generosity toward immigrant populations.[7]

[6]Immigrants from Europe declined from 1.3 million in the 1950s to 800,000 in the 1970s (*INS Statistical Yearbook* 2000). In comparison, immigrants from non-European countries increased from 800,000 in the 1950s to over 1.8 million in the 1970s. The Hart–Celler Act of 1965 also increased the overall flow of immigrants into the United States. In 1970, the foreign-born population was 4.7 percent of the population. By the end of the century, the foreign-born population increased to roughly 12 percent of the U.S. population.

[7]For the purposes of this article, welfare policy broadly refers to redistributive means-tested public assistance programs, including TANF, food stamps, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income, and state-funded prenatal care.

Most existing studies of state-level welfare policy adoptions examine dimensions of welfare policy related to cash benefit levels (see e.g., McGuire and Merriman 2006), work requirements (see e.g., Fellowes and Rowe 2004; Soss *et al*. 2001), or sanction for noncompliance with program rules (see e.g., Fording, Soss, and Schram 2007; Soss *et al*. 2001). Additional forms of welfare policy stringency include initial eligibility or access to government programs. Determining program eligibility is a crucial gate-keeping step in receiving government assistance, and states vary in terms of selecting who qualifies for benefits. Some states attach citizenship requirements to welfare boundaries, statutorily denying immigrants access to public assistance (Filindra 2013; Fix, Capps, and Kaushal 2009; Graefe *et al*. 2008; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Monogan 2013; Tichenor 2002).

PRWORA, in regards to immigration, had the broad aims to increase state policy options and flexibility, decrease dependence on government benefits, alter responsibility for the support of immigrants to the U.S. states, and encourage naturalization (Borjas and Hilton 1996). Under PRWORA, the federal government instituted a five-year moratorium on cash assistance and Medicaid coverage for immigrants arriving after 1996, but the bans only extended to federal welfare dollars. States retained the flexibility to include or exclude immigrants from state originated funds, and these policy responses motivate our empirical analysis presented in the next section.[8]

Research Design

Previous research on generalized trust finds robust empirical evidence for individual-level support of inclusive welfare policies (Crepaz 2008). In addition, trust is a predictor of more effective state governments (Uslaner 2002), but the effect of trust on state government policy can be undermined by increasing diversity (see e.g., Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Baldwin and Huber 2010; Soss, Fording, and Schram 2011) and particularly segregated communities (Massey and Denton 1998; Uslaner 2012). Our theory of social solidarity, measured as trust in other people, builds on these previous studies to develop individual and state-level hypotheses to study the inclusiveness of immigrant welfare policy in the U.S. states.

Variables for the Individual-Level Analysis

At the individual level, we examine racial and geographic predictors of distrust. The individual-level results are used to predict which states we believe will have greater levels of distrust, ultimately providing insight into the variance in immigrant access to welfare programs following the passage of PRWORA in

[8]Descriptive statistics for variables are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix.

1996. States adopted policies determining immigrant access to welfare programs primarily in 1997. To avoid endogeneity (i.e., the influence of the adopted policies on political attitudes), we examine attitudes prior to the passage of PRWORA. In particular, we use 3,467 survey respondents from the American National Election Study (ANES) and General Social Survey (GSS).[9]

To measure distrust, we use a question that asks, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" Respondents were given the options of "Most people can be trusted" (coded as –1), "Don't Know" (coded as 0),[10] and "Can't be too careful" (coded as 1) indicting distrust of others. Since the dependent variable is ordinal, we use ordered logistic regression to test our individual-level hypotheses.

Our independent variables of interest at the individual level are measures of race and Southern residency.[11] For a variety of reasons, we predict that minorities are less trusting than the non-Latino Whites (Uslaner 2002). The individual-level model includes a measure of race for Blacks coded as 1. The baseline comparison group is non-Latino Whites.[12] Further, the United States is one of the least integrated societies among developed countries (see Massey and Denton 1998; Uslaner 2012). The effect of isolation and the regional and historical differences in racial strife should increase levels of distrust. Individuals who live in the South should have higher levels of distrust than those who live in non-Southern states irrespective of race.[13]

We include control variables for political ideology, partisanship, socioeconomic status, and demographics. Political ideology is measured on the individual level using a seven-point scale asking respondents to self-place themselves on a seven-point ideological spectrum.[14] The seven-point scale for political ideology ranges from extremely liberal (0) to extremely conservative (1). To measure partisanship, we use a seven-point Party ID scale that measures both party

[9]To obtain a larger Black sample size, we combine the GSS and ANES together. All survey questions are similarly worded, contain comparable possible responses, and are coded the same.

[10]A total of 94 respondents, or 2.7 percent, of the sample answered "Don't Know." Removing these individuals from the sample and estimating a logistic regression model (distrust would be dichotomous without the middle category) does not result in changes in coefficient direction and/or significance of the independent variables.

[11]We coded missing data and "Don't Know" responses as the middle category for each independent and control variable. Excluding these respondents from the analysis does not alter the direction and significance of the coefficients.

[12]We exclude Latinos from the analysis due to having a small sample size.

[13]We code individuals living in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia as being in the South (coded as 1) and individuals in all other states as 0.

[14]Respondents were asked, "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?"

identification and strength of identification. The partisanship scale ranges from "strong Democrat" (coded as 0) to "strong Republican" (coded as 1).[15]

To measure personal economic situation, we use a measure of yearly household income in constant dollars similar to Gilens (1999).[16] First, individuals with higher incomes are predicted to be less distrusting. We created a nine-category variable ranging from 0, less than $5,000 yearly, to 1, more than $105,000 yearly. Second, we included a measure of education as the highest degree earned ranging from less than a high school education (0) to having a graduate degree (1). More educated individuals are less likely to view immigrants as a cultural and/or economic threat (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007) and are more politically tolerant (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003). We believe that more educated individuals hold higher levels of trust in other people, which in turn, generates lower levels of threat and greater levels of tolerance. Age is included in the individual-level models with a four-categorical measure ranging from 0 (18- to-29-year-olds) to 1 (65 and older). Previous scholars find mixed and inconsistent results for age cohort effects on social trust. For example, some studies show that older individuals are more trusting than younger individuals (see e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Robinson and Jackson 2001; Uslaner 2002) and other studies find a U-curve with younger and older individuals being distrusting (see e.g., Delhey and Newton 2003; Newton 2001; Patterson 1999; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 2002). Due to these ambiguous findings, we lack directional expectations for the relationship between age and social trust, but include the variable as a control. The final individual-level control variable is gender, coded 0 for males and 1 for females. Research on American political behavior finds that females are less trusting than males (Patterson 1999), but gender differences are much smaller than in other Western countries (Newton 2001). As such, we expect that females be more distrusting than males but this gender gap is a product of American society.

> Hypothesis 1: Black citizens will be significantly more distrusting than non-Latino White citizens.

> Hypothesis 2: Southern citizens will be significantly more distrusting than non-Southern citizens.

Variables for the State-Level Analysis

At the state level, we use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression due to our continuous dependent variable. The dependent variable is the *immigration*

[15]In addition to the two mainstream political parties, individuals had the option of picking "No preference" or "Other party." We decided to code these respondents as Independents (coded as .5). Independents are usually described by the mass media as individuals who are registered as neither Democrats nor Republicans but are registered as Independents or members of third political parties.

[16]The question asks respondents to indicate the "letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 1995 before taxes."

welfare scale (IWS), originally developed by Rodney Hero and Robert Preuhs (2007) in their study of immigrant accessibility to welfare policies. The components of the scale tap the access of qualified and post-enactment immigrants to a wide variety of social spending programs in 1998, including state-funded TANF during the federal five-year ban for immigrants; access to TANF state funding after the federal five-year ban; general assistance programs; food stamps; state-level programs similar to Supplemental Security Income; access to Medicaid during the federal five-year ban. Qualified immigrants are defined as an immigrant who is either a lawful permanent resident, a refugee, paroled into the United States for at least one year, a battered spouse, or a battered child (Tumlin, Zimmerman, and Ost 1999).[17] A post-enactment immigrant is an individual who was admitted into the United States after PRWORA became enacted on August 22, 1996. The data is coded as 1 for granting post-enactment and qualified immigrants' access, 0 for denying these immigrants' access to programs influenced by PRWORA, and 1 for granting illegal immigrants access to nonemergency health and prenatal care.

Hero and Preuhs (2007) use principal component factor analysis to generate an overall score of how inclusive each state's social programs are for immigrants. The IWS ranges from −1.11 to 1.67 with positive and higher values being more inclusive states and negative and lower numbers being more restrictive states. The average value is −.02 with a standard deviation of .91. Hero and Preuhs (2007, 502) find that the first factor has an eigenvalue of 2.56 and the value for the second factor is .67. In addition, the Cronbach's Alpha is .75 indicating a high level of interitem reliability (Hero and Preuhs 2007, 502).[18]

At the state level, we include our independent variable of interest, social trust, and a series of control variables.[19] We hypothesize that states with lower levels of social trust are more likely to adopt policies restricting immigrants' access to welfare. We estimate a state-level measure of distrust[20] using a trust

[17]A battered spouse or child requires "a pending or approved spousal visa or a petition for relief under the Violence Against Women Act" to be considered a qualified immigrant (Tumlin, Zimmerman, and Ost 1999, 2).

[18]Hero and Preuhs (2007) compare the IWS to other measures of immigrant access to welfare programs. The IWS correlates with the Urban Institute's measure of the immigrant welfare safety net (Pearson's r = .85), Tumlin, Zimmerman, and Ost's (1999) index of immigrant welfare provisions (Pearson's r = .83), and an additive index of the nine social programs used to estimate the IWS (Pearson's r = .98). In the end, the IWS is a reliable measure of immigrant inclusiveness to state welfare programs.

[19]All independent and control variables are lagged by at least one year to avoid issues of endogeneity with the IWS.

[20]Distrust is related to many core values, such as prejudice and authoritarianism. One important limitation of MRP is that the estimates are based on dichotomous measures. Measures of prejudice and authoritarianism are ordinal with more than two categories, making it difficult to generate state-level estimates of these predictors of distrust. In addition, MRP estimates can be correlated due to the independent variables used to generate the estimates.

question from the 1996 ANES and a recently developed statistical method called multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP).[21] Our measure of state-level distrust is related to alternative measures. Uslaner (2002) uses disaggregation to estimate the level of trust by state for the 1990s. His measure of trust is correlated with our measure of distrust (Pearson's $r = -.61$, $p < .01$).[22] As an additional robustness check, we estimate distrust by combining multiple ANES and GSS surveys forming a disaggregated measure of distrust. The correlation between the disaggregated measure and the MRP measure is .79 ($p < .01$).[23] In addition, social trust is related to social capital and commonly used as a component of measuring social capital. We compare our measure of social distrust to two different measures of social capital. We find that Putnam's (2000) social capital index is weakly yet significantly correlated with social distrust ($r = -.32$, $p < .05$), but our measure is strongly correlated with Hawes, Rocha, and Meier's (2013) measure of social capital ($r = -.60$, $p < .01$).[24] Due to the number of missing states in Uslaner's (2002) measure of trust and our disaggregated measure of distrust, we use the MRP measure as the independent variable of interest for the state-level models.

We include a series of control variables in the state-level models to measure political ideology, partisanship, economics, and demographics. First, we include citizen ideology measures first developed by Berry and others (1998). We predict that more conservative individuals will be less trusting and more conservative states to have lower IWS scores (Hero and Preuhs 2007). Second, we use Erikson, Wright, and McIver's (1993) (hereafter EWM) measure of the percentage of a state population identifying themselves as Republicans. The EWM partisanship measure has been updated for several years following their study, including for 1996. We expect a positive coefficient between individual partisanship and distrust, with Republicans holding higher levels of distrust, and that states with large Republican populations will be less likely to grant immigrants access to welfare than states with smaller Republican populations. Third, the economic situation of the state can increase the demand for generous social programs among the public and influence the generosity of the legislature to fund social spending programs by providing a means to increase

[21]The multilevel model used for MRP is not the same as the models reported in Table 1. See Appendix B for more details about the MRP model used to estimate distrust on the state level. Research on MRP models indicates that highly accurate state-level values can be estimated with the simpler model that we use (see Lax and Phillips 2009b).

[22]Uslaner's (2002) state-level measure of trust does not include the states of HI, ID, ME, NE, NM, and NV due to small sample sizes.

[23]The disaggregation estimates of distrust do not include the states of AK, HI, ID, ME, MT, NE, NM, NV, RI, SD, and UT due to small sample sizes.

[24]Both measures of social capital are missing values for AK and HI. In addition, neither the Putnam (2000) nor the Hawes, Rocha, and Meier (2013) measure of social capital is a significant predictor of the IWS when we include the same control variables as Model 3A in Table 3. These results are available upon request of the authors.

funding (Graefe *et al*. 2008; Plotnick and Winters 1985; Tweedie 1994). We control for the state's unemployment rate and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. States with lower levels of unemployment and higher GDP per capita should have more inclusive welfare programs for immigrants. Fourth, sharing a border with Mexico is expected to decrease immigrant welfare accessibility due to the greater media coverage of immigration along the border (Branton and Dunaway 2009; Dunaway Branton, and Abrajano 2010) and greater immigration flows. Finally, Democratic legislatures are known to be more generous and inclusive in their welfare policy reforms, such as allowing immigrants access to welfare programs.

We do not include several control variables in the state-level models from previous research. Many of these variables are used as part of the multilevel modeling and post-stratification in the MRP modeling to generate state-level public opinion estimates. As mentioned in Appendix B, the process of using MRP includes post-stratification that weights the final value based on demographic and geographic combinations. In this manner, our distrust estimates are partially based on these characteristics, such as race, age, and education. The introduction of state-level measures with our MRP estimates of distrust can create multicollinearity in the model. We do make an exception in separate models by including the proportion of Blacks, Latinos, and foreign born in each state. We include these measures to demonstrate that the relationship between distrust and IWS is robust and tapping more than just racial demographics alone.

> Hypothesis 3: States with higher levels of social distrust will exhibit more restrictive immigrant access to social welfare programs.

Analysis

We start by examining the individual-level racial and geographic predictors of distrust in Table 1 and these results provide insight into our state-level estimates. As expected, the measures of race are positively and significantly related to distrust, indicating that Blacks are less trusting than Whites (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). To provide the substantive influence of the race variable, we calculate predicted probabilities using *Clarify* (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). We estimate the probability of being distrustful for each group while holding other variables constant at their mean or median values. The predicted probability for a non-Latino White being distrustful is 57.6 percent. Moving the race of the individual to Black increases the predicted probability to roughly 79.1 percent.

Shifting our focus to the control variables, we find evidence supporting previous research. We start with political identifications: political ideology and partisanship. We find that conservatives are more distrustful of other individuals than liberals, but partisanship is insignificant due to the correlation between ideology and partisanship ($r = .43$, $p < .001$). Excluding political ideology

Table 1. Individual-Level Determinants of Social Distrust

	Model 1A	Model 1B	Model 1C Whites	Model 1D Blacks
Black	1.03***	.99***		
	(.14)	(.14)		
South		.25**	.27**	.13
		(.08)	(.08)	(.26)
Political Ideology	.65***	.61**	.74***	−.60
	(.20)	(.20)	(.21)	(.57)
Party ID	.10	.10	.06	.25
	(.13)	(.13)	(.13)	(.55)
Income	−.75***	−.74***	−.74***	−.69
	(.15)	(.15)	(.15)	(.55)
Education	−1.40***	−1.39***	−1.38***	−1.48**
	(.12)	(.12)	(.12)	(.43)
Age	−.80***	−.79***	−.80***	−.74
	(.11)	(.11)	(.12)	(.40)
Female	.10	.09	.09	.18
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.27)
Log Likelihood	−2,466.29	−2,460.91	−2,234.87	−223.57
Chi^2	348.40	352.86	257.76	26.56
Prob> Chi^2	.01	.01	.01	.01
Pseudo R^2	.07	.08	.06	.05
N	3,467	3,467	3,023	444

Sources: 1996 ANES and 1996 GSS.
Notes: Entries are ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. **p < .01; ***p < .001. Higher values on the above variables indicate greater likelihood of distrusting other people.

from the model results in partisanship reaching standard levels of significance and the coefficient indicating that Republicans are less trusting than Democrats. The coefficients for income, education, and age are significantly and negatively associated with our individual-level measure of distrust. More affluent, highly educated, and older individuals are more trusting of other people.

In addition, we predicted that the South would have higher levels of distrust due to the regional ethnic history and higher levels of segregation. Further analysis of the individual-level data finds that respondents living in the South have a significantly higher mean score (.36), indicating greater levels of distrust, than people living in the North or West (.18), $t = -5.47$, $p < .01$. In Model 1B, we add the South variable and re-estimate our initial baseline model. Individuals in the South do hold greater levels of distrust than those in the North. We use predicted probabilities to estimate the substantive difference by shifting an average individual (holding all variables at their mean value) from living in the North to the South. A Southerner is 6.1 percent more likely

to be distrustful than their hypothetical non-Southern counterpart. In Models 1C and 1D, we examine the effects of residency on each racial group by estimating separate models for Whites and Blacks. Whites living outside of the South hold lower levels of distrust (.13) than those living in the South (.28), $t = -4.12$, $p < .01$. Using Model 1C, we estimate that shifting a non-Latino White from the North to the South increases the probability of being distrustful from 54.6 to 61.2 percent. Southern Blacks have higher levels of distrust (.70) than their northern counterparts (.62), $t = -1.20$, $p > .05$, but this difference is not statistically significant once we include the control variables in Model 1D. The extremely high levels of distrust among Blacks in the South and North is not surprising given that the United States is only a couple of generations removed from the Civil Rights Movement, the reality that minorities experience continued social, economic, and sometimes political discrimination, and the high level of contemporary racial segregation (Uslaner 2012). In the end, we expect to find that states with large minority populations and Southern states to have higher levels of distrust.

The MRP state-level estimates of distrust are presented in Table 2. Based on our individual-level findings, we predict that states in the south with large Black populations will have higher levels of distrust. Overall, the average proportion of Americans that distrust is 62.2 percent. The state with the lowest level of distrust is Massachusetts (54.78 percent) and the state with the highest value is Mississippi (71.30 percent). A quick glance of these estimates tells us a few things. First, the majority of people in every state exhibit distrusting attitudes. Second, we discover a stark regional difference in the level of distrust. Southern states tend to have higher levels of distrust when compared to the northeast, midwest, and west coasts. Following Mississippi, the least trusting states are Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, Texas, and Tennessee. Overall, the average level of distrust in Southern states is 67.22 with a standard deviation of .764. In comparison, non-Southern states have a lower average level of distrust at 60.82 with a standard deviation of .487. There are some distrusting non-Southern states, such as Utah, but the Southern association with distrust remains apparent.

Figure 1 presents a scatterplot of the bivariate relationship between distrust and our dependent variable, the IWS. Positive values along the y-axis indicate states that are more inclusive of immigrants and negative values indicate that states are more exclusive. A clear associative pattern emerges as the proportion of the state population that distrusts increases, the amount of immigrant access to social programs decreases. Once the level of distrust reaches one standard deviation above the mean or 66.14, every state is overall more exclusive of immigrant access to social spending programs. Examining the opposite quadrant, the lower left, we find an outlier in New Hampshire. New Hampshire restricts immigrant access to social spending programs but also has a lower level of distrust.

Public policy is shaped by other factors including racial demographics (see e.g., Hero and Preuhs 2007; Key 1949; Soss *et al.* 2001), political institutions

Table 2. State-Level Public Opinion Estimates of Social Distrust Using MRP and Summary Statistics

State	Distrust	State	Distrust
Mississippi	71.30	Michigan	61.65
Alabama	69.65	Nevada	61.63
Louisiana	69.07	Arizona	61.45
South Carolina	68.39	Alaska	61.43
Georgia	67.47	Delaware	61.26
Texas	67.41	Pennsylvania	61.10
Arkansas	67.31	Maryland	61.04
Utah	66.91	Illinois	60.78
Tennessee	66.84	Wisconsin	60.21
Kentucky	66.70	Montana	60.15
Oklahoma	66.64	New York	59.95
North Carolina	65.82	California	59.80
Indiana	64.51	Iowa	59.77
West Virginia	64.25	New Jersey	59.77
Idaho	64.12	Colorado	58.35
New Mexico	64.00	Connecticut	57.67
Missouri	63.44	Hawaii	57.66
Wyoming	63.38	Oregon	57.66
Florida	63.30	Minnesota	57.60
Virginia	62.83	Maine	57.50
Nebraska	62.64	Rhode Island	57.44
Kansas	62.23	Washington	56.94
Ohio	62.15	New Hampshire	56.67
South Dakota	61.82	Vermont	55.13
North Dakota	61.81	Massachusetts	54.78
Mean	62.22		
SD	3.92		

Source: 1996 ANES.

(see e.g., Barilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Dye 1984), economic factors (see e.g., Dawson and Robinson 1963), partisanship, and political ideology (see e.g., Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1987, 1989) that can also explain away the opinion-policy linkage between distrust and IWS.[25] Due to the nonpartisan nature of Nebraska state politics, we lack values for the percent of Democrats in the state legislature. We also lack state-level partisanship measures (percent Republican) for Hawaii and Alaska. Thus we exclude Nebraska, Hawaii, and Alaska from the analysis.

Turning to citizen ideology in Table 3, we find weak results for the idea that immigrant exclusion is a driven by mass conservatism. The coefficient between

[25]We checked for issues with collinearity in the model. The average VIF value is 2.31. The highest VIF value is 3.38 for citizen ideology. Distrust has a VIF value of 3.20. All the values are within acceptable levels.

Figure 1.
The Relationship between Social Distrust and IWS



Notes: Distrust is an MRP estimate of the proportion of a state's population holding distrusting attitudes. Higher values indicate larger populations holding distrusting attitudes. Higher values for the IWS indicate states that allow immigrants greater access to welfare programs. Negative values on the IWS are states that overall deny immigrants access to welfare programs. All other variables are held constant.

IWS and citizen ideology is statistically insignificant suggesting that decisions regarding immigration access to social spending programs transcend conventional ideological divisions and goes beyond a philosophical desire for small government.[26] The remaining political variables provide additional support that traditional political explanations fail to explain immigrant inclusion into social welfare programs. The percentage of individuals identifying themselves as Republican in a state does not significantly alter immigrant access to welfare programs.[27] Further, the percentage of Democrats in the state legislature, which is expected to result in more generous and liberal social spending policies (Erickson, Wright, and McIver 1993), is not significantly related to the IWS.[28]

[26]Citizen ideology is significant when we exclude the proportion of Democrats in the state legislature and the proportion of self-identified Republicans in the state population.

[27]The correlation between citizen ideology and percent of individuals identifying themselves as Republican in a state is high ($r = -.650$, $p < .001$). We ran separate models for both variables. Neither variable reaches traditional levels of significance while excluding the other.

[28]An alternative explanation is that party control may have the opposite than expected coefficient when also controlling for ideology (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). Political parties are likely to move toward the ideological position of the voters. For example, Republicans may act more moderate and liberal in states with more liberal populations.

Table 3. Social Distrust and Immigrant Welfare Accessibility in the U.S. States

	IWS Model 3A	IWS Model 3B	IWS Model 3C
Constant	3.09	4.78	5.17
	(2.84)	(4.72)	(4.79)
Distrust	−.11**	−.14**	−.14**
	(.04)	(.06)	(.07)
Citizen Ideology	.02	.02	.01
	(.01)	(.03)	(.01)
% Republican	.02	.02	.02
Partisanship	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
% Democratic	.01	.01	.01
Legislature	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Border State—Mexico	.13	.69	.24
	(.25)	(.67)	(.37)
Unemployment Rate	.11	.16	.12
	(.11)	(.13)	(.13)
State GDP per capita	.04***	.04***	.04**
	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)
% Black		.01	.01
		(.02)	(.02)
% Latino		−.02	
		(.02)	−.01
% Foreign Born			(.04)
R^2	.65	.66	.65
N	47	47	47

Notes: OLS regression with robust standard errors in the parentheses. **p < .05, ***p < .01. The IWS dependent variable is a factor analysis combination of immigrant access to welfare programs. Higher values indicate greater access to welfare programs.
Missing States: Alaska, Hawaii, and Nebraska.

In addition, we include several state characteristics that may influence public opinion or the means and willingness to offer immigrant's access to social spending programs. Overall, these additional control variables do not perform well. The economic measure for unemployment rates is not significant and the coefficient is close to zero; however, GDP per capita is a significant predictor of IWS. States with higher GDP per capita are more likely to expand immigrant access to social welfare programs. The geographic location of sharing a border with Mexico has a sizeable and negative effect, but the coefficient is not significant.

Despite the inclusion of these control variables, the relationship between distrust and excluding immigrants from welfare programs remains strong. Figure 2 displays the marginal effects of distrust on the IWS for Model 3A. The bivariate pattern found in Figure 1 holds in Figure 2 with the inclusion of control variables. The predicted IWS mean for Massachusetts with a level of distrust at 54.78 is roughly 1, indicating a more inclusive welfare policy for

Figure 2.
The Marginal Effects of Distrust on IWS



Notes: Estimates of adjusted means based on Model 3A. Distrust is an MRP estimate of the proportion of a state's population holding distrusting attitudes. Higher values indicate larger populations holding distrusting attitudes. Higher values for the IWS indicate states that allow immigrants greater access to welfare programs. Negative values on the IWS are states that overall deny immigrants access to welfare programs. All other variables are held constant.

immigrants. As distrust increases, welfare policies become more exclusive, as indicated by the downward sloping line.

The size of minority populations can have a direct influence on welfare policies (see e.g., Fording 2003; Hero 1998; Hero and Preuhs 2007; Johnson 2003; Wright 1976) and have an indirect impact on political attitudes, both positive (contact theory) and negative (group threat theory) (see e.g., Blalock 2000; Hopkins 2010; Key 1949; Quillian 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002). We add the demographic variables in separate models due to the inclusion of these variables in the post-stratification component of the MRP method. In Model 3B, we include the proportion of Blacks and Latinos in each state. The effect of distrust on the IWS holds even with the inclusion of these racial and ethnic variables. The MRP estimates of distrust are partially based on these demographic variables but the effect is not dependent on the proportion of Blacks and Latinos in the state. Due to the high correlation between the proportion of Latinos and foreign born individuals in a state ($r = .758$, $p < .001$), we estimate a separate regression model controlling for the immigrant population. Model 3C provides similar results as Model 3B.

Conclusion

Workfare reform policies in the 1990s effectively decentralized welfare policy making to the U.S. states. One understudied dimension of state policies involves inclusion or exclusion of newly arriving immigrants into the welfare state. Previous comparative research argues persuasively that trusting others to utilize welfare programs in responsible and appropriate ways predict immigrant access to government-sponsored programs. Through incorporating theoretical and methodological developments into the American context, we argue and find evidence that attitudes of social trust in others undergirds support for immigrant access to redistributive means-tested programs. States that exhibit higher levels of trustworthiness in others are more likely to expand immigrant access to welfare programs, whereas less trusting states are likely to exhibit welfare chauvinism limiting immigrant access. Interestingly, evidence suggests that levels of social distrust and immigrant welfare exclusion are more pronounced in heavily Black and Southern states, not in states with sizeable Latino or immigrant populations. We believe that a unique regional Southern history of racial division helped foment attitudes of distrust in others and helps explain contemporary immigrant exclusion.

Our results have limitations and implications for the understanding of policy and future research. One important implication of our study is that immigrants are entering a social context with a preexisting level of social trust that influences policy preferences. American society is highly segregated. Societies with greater social contact may develop higher levels of trust that decrease the relationship between distrust and welfare chauvinism. In addition, the trust-policy linkage may apply to only certain types of government policies, those already associated with marginalized groups within society. For example, trust should yield support for public policies toward the elderly, such as social security, while distrust should weaken support for race-specific policies, such as affirmative action. Trust may not impact policies that public views as not favoring any particular group within society, such as education. As a result future research may show that the relationship between trust and policy is limited to policies that individuals view as being overtly racialized or ethnicized in the general public.

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics for the Individual and State-Level Models

Individual-Level Variables	Mean (Standard Deviation)	Min (Max)	State-Level Variables	Mean (Standard Deviation)	Min (Max)
Distrust	.24 (.97)	−1 (1)	IWS	0.0 (.91)	−1.11 (1.67)

Table A1. Continued

Individual-Level Variables	Mean (Standard Deviation)	Min (Max)	State-Level Variables	Mean (Standard Deviation)	Min (Max)
Black	.13	0	Distrust	62.22	54.8
	(.33)	(1)		(3.92)	(71.3)
South	.37	0	Citizen Ideology	49.27	22.84
	(.48)	(1)		(14.79)	(86.48)
Political Ideology	.54	0	% Republican	31.38	9.6
	(.21)	(1)	Partisanship	(6.94)	(45)
Party ID	.46	0	% Democratic	51.54	15
	(.34)	(1)	Legislature	(15.42)	(84.61)
Income	.48	0	Border State—Mexico	.08	0
	(.28)	(1)		(.27)	(1)
Education	.51	0	Unemployment Rate	4.3	2.5
	(.34)	(1)		(1.02)	(6.6)
Age	.50	0	State GDP per capita	39.64	28.4
	(.33)	(1)		(7.39)	(63.5)
Female	.56	0	% Black	10.17	.36
	(.50)	(1)		(9.58)	(36.42)
			% Latino	6.70	.56
				(8.44)	(40.31)
			% Foreign Born	3.76	0
				(3.74)	(19)

Sources: 1996 ANES and 1996 GSS for individual-level variables.

Appendix B: Measuring Social Distrust on the State Level

To test our theory, we need to construct estimates of distrust at the state level. Unfortunately, we are unaware of a survey that contains the proper questions with representative samples from each state. The ANES contains the necessary questions but lacks a representative sample from each state. The lack of a representative samples at the state level creates a concern about biases in the data (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993). For example, Park, Gelman, and Bafumi (2006) noted in their study of voting results that a national random sample from a CBS/ *New York Times* survey included twelve individuals from Vermont. In 1988, 80 percent of the surveyed individuals supported George H. W. Bush, but President Bush won Vermont with 51 percent of the vote. Small samples are more error prone than large samples, a well-known concept in the study of public opinion.

To overcome this problem, we estimate a state-level measure of distrust by using the individual-level trust question from the 1996 ANES and a recently developed statistical method called multilevel regression and post-stratification (MRP).[29] MRP estimates state-level attitudes from surveys with national samples using two stages: a multilevel model and post-stratification (Kastellec, Lax, and Phillips 2010; Lax and Phillips 2009a, 2009b, 2012; Park, Gelman, and Bafumi 2006). The underlying logic is

[29]We used R 2.11.1 and lme4 for LMER function to estimate the level of distrust for each state.

to take a single national survey of roughly 1,400 individuals and use these respondents to generate accurate state-level estimates. In the first stage, MRP estimates a multilevel model (see the exact equation we use below) using demographic and geographic variables by nesting individual responses within states resulting in 4,704 total possible combinations (Lax and Phillips 2009b). For example, one possible combination would be an estimate of distrust for an 18- to 25-year-old White male with a high school diploma living within the Midwest state of Iowa. The data to make these estimates are based on the entire national sample, not just individuals from a single state. As a result, MRP is able to use respondents regardless of location to create public opinion estimates for all states, even those with few to no respondents. This allows MRP to overcome the inevitable small state-level sample sizes found in national surveys.

$$\Pr(y_i=1)=\text{logit}^{-1}(\beta^0+\alpha_{j[i]}^{\text{race,gender}}+\alpha_{k[i]}^{\text{age}}+\alpha_{l[i]}^{\text{edu}}+\alpha_{s[i]}^{\text{state}})$$
$$\alpha_s^{\text{state}} \sim \text{N}(\alpha_{m[s]}^{\text{region}}+ \beta^{\text{relig}}\times \text{relig}_s, \sigma^2_{\text{state}})$$

The second stage of MRP involves post-stratification. In this stage, the MRP estimates for the 4,704 total possible demographic and geographic combinations are weighted by the actual percentages within each state population by matching census data to estimated attitudes for each category (race, gender, age, education, and the interaction between race and gender). The additional step of post-stratification corrects for oversampling or undersampling of demographic categories (Voss, Gelman, and King 1995). In its final product, MRP estimates the percentage of individuals that holds a specific attitude for each state.

About the Authors

Adam M. Butz is an assistant professor in the Graduate Center for Public Policy and Administration at California State University, Long Beach. His research interests include the causes and consequences of administrative privatization, street-level implementation and discretion, comparative public policy with substantive interests in social welfare and criminal justice policy, new public management, and identity politics. His most recent publications include an article in the *Journal of Policy Practice* and an occasional paper prepared for the United States Department of Labor.

Jason E. Kehrberg is a visiting instructor of political science and health science at Muskingum University. His research focuses on the relationship between political attitudes and domestic government policies. He is currently developing a project on how mass measures of authoritarianism shape public policies among the American states.

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